“Meritocracy” is among the political phenomena and political orientations found in modern Western democratic systems. Daniel A. Bell, however, imposes it on ancient Confucianism and contemporary China and refers to it in Chinese using loaded terms such as xianneng zhengzhi 賢能政治 and shangxian zhi 尚賢制. Bell’s “political meritocracy” not only consists of an anti-democratic political program but also is full of logical contradictions: at times, it is the antithesis of democracy, and, at other times, it is a supplement to democracy; sometimes it resolutely rejects democracy, and sometimes it desperately needs democratic mechanisms as the ultimate guarantee of its legitimacy. Bell’s criticism of democracy consists of untenable platitudes, and his defense of “political meritocracy” comprises a series of specious arguments. Ultimately, the main issue with “political meritocracy” is its blatant negation of popular sovereignty as well as the fact that it inherently represents a road leading directly to totalitarianism.

“精英主义”原是西方现代民主制度下的一种政治现象和政治倾向，贝淡宁却将它强加于古代儒家与当代中国，谓之“贤能政治”。贝淡宁的“贤能政治”不仅是一种反民主的政治理论，而且充满着逻辑矛盾：它时而是民主制的对立物，时而又是民主制的补充物；时而坚决拒斥民主，时而又需要民主机制来保证其合法性。贝淡宁对民主政治的批评是站不住脚的老生常谈，对“贤能政治”的辩护也都似是而非。“贤能政治”的要害在其否定人民主权，本质上是一条通往极权之路。

To construct socialism with Chinese characteristics, advance socialist democracy, and establish a political ecology for socialism with Chinese characteristics, we should devote our efforts toward building a stronger political system and strengthening the rule of law and democracy. Important projects, such as the anti-corruption campaign, mass-line education, or team building for government officials should be guided by the spirit of democracy and the rule of law and proceed in an orderly and regulated manner. Still, voices in support of political meritocracy have become increasingly audible in Chinese political and academic circles, supporting a political phenomenon completely incompatible with the goal of building a socialist democracy. Meritocracy as a political system entails a high degree of uncertainty, unsustainability, and risk and is essentially just a modified version of the rule of man or, to put it differently, the rule of man “2.0.” Its fatal weakness is its inability to resolve two fundamental problems related to the legitimacy of political power: Where does power originate, and how can we control it? An important theoretical prerequisite for building a clean political ecology is thus to demystify meritocracy and dispel any popular myths surrounding it.

建设中国特色社会主义，发展社会主义民主，构建有中国特色的社会主义的政治生态，所要致力的，应当是加强制度建设，尤其是法治与民主制度建设，把反腐、群众路线教育、干部队伍建设，统统纳入民主与法治的轨道，有秩序、有程序、有法度地进行。但在中国现实政治实践领域，以及学术界和理论界，却发出了主张贤能政治的声音，这是与社会主义民主政治建设的生态要求格格不入的一种政治现象。贤能政治在制度设计上潜含着极大的不确定性、非持续性甚至高风险性，其实质不过是人治的改进形式，或者说是人治的“2.0版”；其最为致命的软肋，在于无力更无法从根本制度层面，解决权力的来源和权力的制约这两个关涉政权合法性的根本性问题。因此，构建良好政治生态的一个重要理论前提，就是为贤能政治脱魅，祛除人们对于贤能政治的迷思。

Compared to Wang Shaoguang’s approach to re-interpret the old concept “democracy” to overcome the Schumpeterian model of political legitimation, Daniel Bell’s Political Meritocracy takes a more challenging path, attempting to build a new discourse of legitimacy centering on the concept “meritocracy” and incorporating elements of ancient China’s traditions, the socialist revolutions in the twentieth century, and the system of competitive elections common in the Western world today. This inspiring work is full of incisive arguments, but could be improved by further considering the tension between the Confucian tradition and the revolutionary tradition in the twentieth century.

In the pre-Qin era, the xianneng 賢能 [those of virtue and talent] were a commonly discussed topic, on which every school of thought had its own views. Daoist discussions on the xianneng sometimes reflected strong aversion and rejection, yet at other times gave them abundant praise and approval. Because of uncertainty on the universality of moral principles, on the limitations of one’s individual ability, and on the effectiveness of political actions, views in the Laozi 老子 and the Zhuangzi 莊子 on the xianneng saving society were skeptical in nature, sometimes even taking a mocking tone. Scholars of the Huang-Lao tradition had realized the limitations of individual ability and hoped that the greatest level of political benefit could be attained. Consequently, under the premise of safeguarding monarchical authority, fully displaying the skills and talents of all kinds of sages (imperial teachers and virtuous officials) through the practice of wuwei 無為 [inaction], and the highest leaders’ respect for virtue became the main direction in the Huang-Lao understanding of the xianneng. This tendency has much in common with the Legalist school of thought.

“贤能”是先秦时代的公共话题，各家都有自己独到的见解。道家关于“贤能”问题的回应，有时表现出强烈的反感和否定，有时又表现出充分的赞许与肯定。基于对道德原则普遍性、个人能力有限性、政治行为有效性的怀疑，《老子》与《庄子》对于贤能救世的观点表示出相当的警惕，甚至加以嘲讽；黄老道家既认识到个人能力的有限，又希望达到最大程度的政治效益，因此在维护君主权威的前提下，通过最高领导者的“无为”与“尊贤”，以充分调动各种贤能之士（帝师与贤臣）的技术与能力，就成为黄老道家“贤能”认识的主要倾向。这种倾向与法家有相通之处。

Lucian W. Pye, the renowned American Sinologist, argues that power/authority in Chinese culture follows a paternalistic structure, that the distinction in Chinese society between public and private has historically been in a state of tension, and therefore that Chinese governance has always emphasized central power over local self-governance, suppressed cultural pluralism, and rebuffed multipolar structures of power. Even though the inherent tension identified by Pye certainly exists, the thesis that Chinese culture has a deeply ingrained authoritarian orientation is simply incorrect. In order to resolve the tension between the public and private realms, Chinese thinkers—from the various strands of legalist thought to the Confucian notion of “kingly governance”—have premised the division of power on the priority of preserving centralized power. In other words, diffusion of power has been premised on the idea of an already collectivized authority. Therefore, the power structure that defines Chinese culture has certainly not been the polycentric one that Pye implicitly values, but neither has it been the centralist, authoritarian structure that he abhors. Rather, it has been the Confucian model premised on the values of governance through ritual and moral virtue. Insights from cultural psychology help explain ethical governance—that is, rule by an ethical meritocracy—in Chinese society and culture.

美国汉学权威白鲁恂（Lucian W. Pye）认为中国文化中的权力/权威是父权型的（paternalistic），公私对立是中国文化中的永恒矛盾，由此导致中国政治一直强调中央集权、反对地方自主、压制文化多元、否定权力多中心等特点。白氏所谓中国文化的内在矛盾诚然存在，“中国文化有根深蒂固的专制倾向”的论断却并非事实。为解决公私矛盾，中国人除了诉诸法家式的集权之外，还有儒家式的王道，其特点是在保障集权的前提下实现分权，即努力在“合”的基础上实现“分”，寓“分”于“合”。因此，中国文化中真正有效的权威模式既不是白氏所欣赏的多中心化的分权模式，也不是白氏所批判的集权专制模式，而是儒家式的礼治和德治模式。从文化心理学的视角来看，德治（包括贤能政治）在中国文化中确存有强大的文化心理基础。