东西方意识哲学中的“意向性”与“元意向性”问题
倪梁康
摘要：东西方意识哲学中都可以发现或多或少的对“意向性”问题的讨论，也都可以发现或强或弱的在“元意向性”方面的要求。“元意向性”意味着一种异于“意向性”但同时也可以包容“意向性”的东西。它被用来描述一种追求原初性、彻底性、超越性和深邃性的思维方式和思想取向。无论是西方哲学的现象学，还是佛教唯识学或儒家心学，它们都不满足于各种意义上的常识或俗谛，试图以各自的方式来扬弃和克服“意向性”。由此也可以重新理解东西方思想中各种意义上的本体论和工夫论主张。
The Issues of “Intentionality” and “Meta-intentionality” in Eastern and Western Philosophies of Consciousness
Ni Liangkang
Discussions as to the issue of “intentionality” can be found, more or less, in both Eastern and Western philosophies of consciousness, and the same holds to the requirements with respect to “meta-intentionality” in stronger or weaker fashion. “Meta-intentionality” refers to something different from but simultaneously embracing “intentionality”. It is employed to describe a sort of thinking mode and orientation seeking for originality, completeness, transcendence and profoundness. Be the Western phenomenology, Buddhism Yogācāra or Confucian theory of mind, they are not content with stopping at the common knowledge or relative truths in various senses but try to renounce and get over “intentionality” in their respective ways. To this connection, the opinions at the level of ontology and theory of skill in various senses in eastern and western thoughts may be understood anew.
